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Sublime Gender Transposition: The Reformed Platonism of Jacques Rancière’s
Aesthetics as Queer Performance
By Karin Sellberg 
Jacques Rancière’s Short Voyages to the Land of People states that he who “persists in the curiosity of his gaze,
displaces his angle of vision, reworks the first way of putting together words and images, undoes the certainties
of place, and thereby reawakens the power present in each of us to become a foreigner on the map of places
and paths generally known as reality” (3). Who is this person? Who has the ability to thus traverse the limits of
society’s settings? Within the parameters of gender and queer studies, this persona has often been found in the
ambiguously gendered, the thoroughly gender-queer or the transgendered. As an embodiment of the original
Platonic hermaphrodite, this character is a symbol of unification or gender deconstruction. [1] By reading
Rancière’s transpositional fantasy in relation to Leo Bersani and John Cameron Mitchell, two iconic (although
controversial) characters within queer theory and performance, I intend to explore the possibilities and limits of
this spatial construction.
Rancière’s work is not often used in relation to queer performance or queer theory. [2] Although his politics of
deconstructive interchange between people of different classes and classifications (Nights of Labor 10) and his
embrace of an aesthetics that continually redistributes the sensible (Politics of Aesthetics 43) correspond closely
with queer theory’s attempt to bring the regimes of “the normal, the legitimate, the dominant” to a collapse
(Halperin 62), Rancière’s work is usually classified according to a different set of parameters. [3] The fact is that,
rather ironically, Rancière’s work has achieved an academic legitimacy that queer theory has always lacked. [4]
My attempt here is not to reshape or reverse this division, or to use the authority of Rancière’s oeuvre to shed
some sort of legitimacy on my selection of queer writers. Rather, in a truly Rancièrean “indisciplinary” fashion, I
wish to open up an opportunity for communication that not merely facilitates exchange, but becomes a
democratic connective event. I will not use Rancière’s work to shed light on queer aesthetics or pose queer
performance as the aesthetic expression of Rancière. I will go back to one of the prevalent aesthetic paradigms
that undergo “collapse” in Rancière’s work and map its corresponding queer lines of interjection and departure.
This begins in the approach to the ancient Greek philosopher Plato’s ethics and aesthetics.
The central focus of both Leo Bersani and Adam Phillips’ Intimacies and John Cameron Mitchell and Stephen
Trask’s Hedwig and the Angry Inch is the vitality and creative connectivity of love, and both of them approach this
topic through the philosophy of Plato. Love is portrayed as a principle that not merely serves the queer cause,
but develops and expands it. Especially in Bersani’s work, love is a critically queering and juxtapositionally
binding force that continually disassembles and reassembles the positions of self and others (Intimacies 87), and
Plato’s legacy becomes the basic foundation for this process. Rancière also engages extensively with Plato, but
encounters the philosopher from an entirely different perspective. Whereas Bersani and Cameron Mitchell’s
Plato comes to stand for progression and exchange, Rancière’s Plato represents the aesthetic and ethical values
that should be reassessed.
Rancière’s work critiques the staleness of Plato’s deterministic division of society in The Republic, The Statesman
and The Laws, [5] and he takes a definitive stance against The Republic’s emphasis on a binary aesthetic
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relationship between the image and its idealised origin. In The Politics of Aesthetics, Rancière distinguishes this
regime as straightforwardly dichotomous (14-16). Plato’s cave allegory famously indicates that an image is
nothing but a poor copy of its original “form” in the world of ideas. It has no inherent value in itself: it is a
mimetic monstrosity, one step removed from the truth and beauty of the truly “real” world (Plato, Republic 240-
248). As Rancière points out, this relationship also distinguishes Plato’s attitude towards poets and philosophers
(Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents 64). Whereas Plato’s utopian Republic has no place whatsoever for the class
of poets, the philosophers or Guardians enjoy the highest of its ranks. They have the pivotal capacity to
distinguish between “something that only appears to be good” and “something that really is” (230; original
emphasis). This indicates a simple distinction between that which is true and real and that which is false and
fictive.
Rancière recognises that Plato’s rejection of mimesis does not necessarily mean that the philosopher would deny
the power of the concepts we consider under the umbrella of aesthetics today: “what we call art makes no sense
to him” (Aesthetics and Its Discontents 64). Plato’s name is attached to what Rancière in Aesthetics and Its Discontents
terms the first of three major philosophical attitudes towards art. The second form is the Aristotelian rejection
of mimesis, but wholehearted embrace of poeisis. Aristotle’s Poetics recognises the very real cathartic effect that a
good imitation can have on its audience or spectators. This effect is produced despite or in addition to the
simple imitation. Faithful and close imitation gives rise to an aesthetic space beyond imitation. The third form
that Rancière lists is the “modernist” distinction of art as unfaithful or failed mimesis. This form is arguably
somewhat of a return to, but also a direct opposite of the Platonic rejection of imitation. The aesthetic space is
produced separately from or in defiance of more direct imitative methods. It is a sphere outside of reality with
an affective power that exceeds the effects of the real. Art is those sublime entities that transport us beyond the
real.
 Rancière’s own attitude towards art and aesthetic philosophy, as it is expressed in The Politics of Aesthetics,
Aesthetics and Its Discontents and The Emancipated Spectator, resides somewhere between the Aristotelian and the
modernist conceptions of reality and mimesis. On the one hand, Rancière believes in art’s power to transpose
us, but on the other hand he believes that this transposition functions upon and within society, not beyond it
(Aesthetics and Its Discontents 7-8). The unfaithful mimesis, that which problematises the definitive nature of reality
has a reformative effect on its structure. Rancière constructs a renegade aesthetics that simultaneously resides
within and beyond the limits of society (Emancipated Spectator 49). The transformative process takes place not
outside reality, but in the interplay or generative friction between reality and mimesis: “it is in the moments
when the real world wavers and seems to reel into mere appearance, more than in the slow accumulation of day-
to-day experiences, that it becomes possible to form a judgement about the world” (Nights of Labor 19). These
moments of slippage produce the possibility for continual catharsis and continual play.
Although Plato’s dualistic construct of image and ideas certainly would be opposed to Rancière’s construction
of art and reality, his discussion of the “aesthetic ethics” of love is more compatible with cultivation and play
(Bersani, Intimacies 87). Not surprisingly, Rancière constructs most of his discussion of Plato’s notion of
aesthetics on The Republic. This is after all where Plato most comprehensively constructs a theory of images and
forms. As Rancière correctly points out, however, Plato’s discussion is not primarily focusing on creative forms
of mimesis here, but rather on the interaction between a conception or an ideal and its disappointing realisation.
In The Symposium and Phaedrus however, Plato moves beyond the strict and immobile boundaries of the world of
ideas, to a conception of ideality in which creative mimesis and juxtapositions of categories are the generative
principle. The strict binary divisions between ideal and actuality, self and others, and various other categorical
positions still remain within the framework of the text, but Plato constructs them in order to subsequently break
them down.
Bersani and Cameron Mitchell both encounter the Plato of The Symposium and Phaedrus through such a
progressive construction and deconstruction of gender and sexual boundaries. Bersani acknowledges that this
process takes a ritualistic and playful guise which, according to Aristotle’s as well as Plato’s rules, has to be
initiated from an overtly constructed, almost abstract state of strict division (Bersani, Intimacies 77). In The
Symposium, this state is most explicitly represented through Aristophanes’ deterministic speech about the
misleadingly named “platonic hermaphrodite,” which features as part of a competition to explain the true
meaning of love. Aristophanes, who is unlucky enough to speak immediately before Plato’s master Socrates,
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explains that in the beginning there were three human genders: “not just the present two, male and female.
There was also a third one, a combination of these two” (Plato, Symposium 27). Each human being had either
two male sides, two female sides or a female and a male side. The gods, however, decided to cut them in half to
decrease their strength. Love is the individual demi-beings’ urge to find the other half from which they have
been so painfully separated (Plato, Symposium 32).
Cameron Mitchell’s gender-ambiguous protagonist Hedwig, in the off-Broadway queer punk musical Hedwig and
the Angry Inch, recounts Aristophanes’ myth in one of its initial songs “The Origin of Love” (31). The musical
delineates Hedwig’s desperate search for love, which has taken her from the restrictions of her life as a boy in
East Berlin to an equally restrictive “freedom” as a gender-ambiguous woman in America. Hedwig is unsure of
what love is exactly, but in accordance with Aristophanes’ myth, she concludes that it is the result of an initial
differentiation and binary dissolution. She thus determines that “[i]t is clear that I must find my other half” (31).
In order to relate to the Platonic hermaphrodite, Hedwig realises that she will have to connect with another
being, but she is uncertain what to look for: “is it a she or a he? Identical to me? Or somehow complementary?
Does my other half have what I don’t?” (31-32). Hedwig contemplates the links between difference and
sameness and decides that both need to be performed. She negotiates the ritualistic effects of this performance
in relation to an act of becoming; “what about sex? Is that how we put ourselves back together again? ... can
two people actually become one again?” (32; my emphasis).
Hedwig thus describes the Platonic hermaphrodite as a concept of pure difference, empowered by an urge for
unity – and this desire is performed in ritual sex acts. Perhaps not surprisingly, Bersani makes comparisons
between Aristophanes’ idea of love making and the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s definition of difference and
desire in “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I.” Like Aristophanes, Lacan describes an
originary moment of simultaneous gendering and division between self and the other, which produces a
subsequent desire to return to the pre-gendered state through sexual intercourse (75-81).  According to Bersani,
such a model of gender and sexuality is useful as long as it is merely regarded as a model. The division into self
and other, individual and surrounding can function as a means of friction, and lead to future progression and
change, as long as it functions as a starting point rather than a final conclusion – and this is, according to
Bersani, ensured by the injection of love (Intimacies 76).
Rancière also recognises the division of self and other in psychoanalysis as a simultaneous source of limitations
and generative possibilities in The Aesthetic Unconscious. However, he emphasises that he is more interested in its
generative possibilities. The various stages and characters that Freud and Lacan present throughout their work is
here presented as dramatic spaces and signifying actors (Rancière, Aesthetic Unconscious 1-3). This is also how
Aristophanes’ speech functions in The Symposium. He prepares a stage for Socrates’ final insights about love –
and this insight is based in the fact that this is nothing but a stage. According to the master, the particular lovers
are merely actors within a continual signifying drama, whereas love itself resides within the productive
connection, the abstraction that draws them together. Socrates explains that the love of a person allows the
character to give birth to, and understand the drama as a drama, and thus to understand the ideal abstraction or
image of love (Symposium 52-53). 
Indeed, the concept of drama or play is also crucial throughout Rancière’s philosophy – especially to his
conception of the interaction and interrelation between image and self and the formation of aesthetics in
society. The various “distributions of the sensible,” the “general distribution of ways of doing and making, as
well as in the relationships they maintain to modes of being and forms of visibility” that Rancière conceptualises
in The Politics of Aesthetics (13) are creative playgrounds that set new identities, new constellations and new
generative processes into motion. Like Bersani, Rancière argues that the fruitfulness of these spaces is
dependent on a heterogeneous element of friction, what he calls a “dissensus”, that continually protects the
process from stagnation (Dissensus 37-38). The type of unity that Aristophanes proposes to be the final goal of
love making is not at all a desirable state to Rancière. In an interview in Artforum he states that “the main enemy
of artistic creativity as well as of political creativity is consensus” as this merely perpetuates society’s “given
roles, possibilities and competencies” (“Art of the possible”). 
Socrates also rejects the idea of absolute unity. Instead, he advocates a type of dissensual immanence. Socrates
considers love partly in terms of a binary opposition, referring to two planes of existence: that of the divine and
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that of the physical, which can also be interpreted as the plane of ideal abstractions and a plane of physical
imitations of these abstractions referred to in The Republic’s cave allegory. He refers to love as a “spirit”; a
concept that resides between the ideal and the image: “Being intermediate between the other two, they fill the
gap between them and enable the universe to form an interconnected whole” (Plato, Symposium 48). It is
important to note that love is thus not just the union of two lovers: it is the concept which unifies the lovers
with their abstract forms. The fact that other people consider there to be an appearance of love between two
lovers, connects the lovers and their observers to the ideal abstraction. When love between lovers is discussed,
“[w]hat we’re doing is picking out one kind of love and applying to it the name (‘love’) that belongs to the
whole class” (Plato, Symposium 51). This image, or continual performance of love, progressively creates an
impression which may lead to the apprehension of the ideal drama.
Socrates’ love is thus a form of in-between-ness: it functions like a connective element or indicator of the
subject’s interactions with the world. At the point of perfection this in-between-ness implodes and the line or
bridge between subject and object dissolves. The in-between becomes complete immanence, the ideal connection,
or the perfect whole. This is where the subject should aim to situate itself. In this sense, Socratic love features
rather strongly in Jacques Rancière’s philosophy. Rancière continually emphasises that the ideal subject position
is the in-between. In The Politics of Aesthetics, he argues that there is an “immanence of thought in sensible
matter” needed in the consideration of art, politics and society (43). In The Future of the Image, he claims that the
creative aesthetic event takes place through an artistic “ambivalence” (106-107) and in The Emancipated Spectator
he poses the emancipatory catharsis in-between communal participation and separation; in the “’being together’
in ‘being apart’” (78).
Rancière’s in-between-ness is not necessarily an abstraction or ideal, however. It is not a perfect form, but a
continual localisation in a political and perceptive process. Socrates’ love is not a predetermined state of
perfection either. As Bersani acknowledges, love is completely unlike the world of ideas in The Republic. Love is
the affective relativity that urges the subject to position itself in relation to the ideally “beautiful and good.”
Bersani argues that “Socratic ideality ... is more cultivated than it is contemplated” (Intimacies 87) and in
accordance with Rancière’s formula for the continually creative redistribution of the sensible it is “Cultivated
through dialogue – intrinsically unending dialogue, for we are always either moving toward or falling away from
the being it is our greatest happiness to ‘re-find’ in others” (Bersani, Intimacies 87).
Socrates describes the cultivating process in terms of an educational “ladder of love”: “the purpose of these
rites, if they are performed correctly, is to reach the final vision of the mysteries” (Plato, Symposium 59). The
ritual performance first takes the form of a sexual union with a beloved object, which if the roles are performed
as roles, leads to the disruption of the particular love, through the comprehension of the generality of this
object’s performance, and so to the comprehension – and apprehension – of the abstract idea of beauty (59-60).
The apprehension of the “beautiful and good” is a creation and destruction of that which seems “beautiful and
good.” Love, for Socrates, is thus an act of catharsis: a deconstruction which leads to a state that is both
physical and abstract; both performance and form. The subject will finally be both liberated and emancipated:
“Instead of this low and small-minded slavery, he will be turned towards the great sea of beauty and gazing on it
he will give birth ... to many beautiful discourses and ideas” (60).
Leo Bersani recognises this Socratic “birth” to be entirely narcissistic, but in the best possible sense that this
term can accommodate: “it undoes the opposition between the active lover and the passive loved one by
instituting a kind of reciprocal self-recognition in which the very opposition between sameness and difference
becomes irrelevant” (Intimacies 86). It is the production of the perfect positioning or the perfect relationship to
one’s self, and it is this narcissistic reality that sets the stage for the development of a type example of dissensual
immanence in the final scenario of John Cameron Mitchell and Stephen Trask’s Hedwig and the Angry Inch.
The protagonist Hedwig eventually finds a lover, Tommy Gnosis, who she thinks may be her “other half”:
“He’s the one. The one who was taken. The one who left. The twin born by fission” (66). Tommy betrays her
however, and makes himself a famous pop star using the songs they have written together. Hedwig’s true
relationship to Tommy is not fully revealed until she sheds her wig, breasts and makeup at the end of the play
and exposes him to be a persona within herself. Her estranged “other half” is literally her creation. Gnosis and
Hedwig are both discovered to be performances, which have been made embodied. The estranged Tommy
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Gnosis is a part of the character that he and Hedwig created together: “me, the real me, the me I used to be”
(42). When Hedwig reunites with Tommy in Cameron Mitchell’s one body, the stage directions state that two
images of a male and a female face, which have been shown on a projector above the stage throughout the
show, should be seen to merge into a new single face (Mitchell & Trask 79).
Socrates states that love is created by the desire of the mortal to become immortal; it is the human desire for the
divine (Plato, Symposium 56), and in accordance with this declaration, Hedwig tells Tommy that love never dies.
When Tommy asks how, Hedwig replies:
(Hedwig:) “Well, perhaps because love creates something that was not there before.”
(Tommy:) “What, like procreation?”
(Hedwig:) “Yes, but not only.”
He grabs my ass and he laughs. I don’t.
(Hedwig:) “Sometimes just creation. Don’t move.”
I paint a bold silver cross on his forehead.
(Mitchell & Trask 64)
The silver cross becomes the marker of the created character; the pop star Tommy Gnosis. As Socrates shows,
love gives birth to knowledge (Gnosis), and to “something beautiful and new” (Mitchell & Trask 74). This
concept is immortal, because it is “more than a woman or a man” (Mitchell & Trask 73): it is the multiply
gendered form; the ideal drama of love, which is reiterated continually through time. Socrates argues that “this
is the way that every mortal thing is maintained in existence, not by being completely the same, as divine things
[the ideals] are, but ... leav[ing] behind another new thing of the same type” (Plato, Symposium 56; my emphasis).
The fact that the punk rock musical Hedwig and the Angry Inch is performed on stage emphasises this idea, since
the same show will inevitably be reiterated in different spaces and with different performing bodies. Hedwig
remains in a continual process of subjective becoming.
So what type of a becoming is this and how does it correspond with queer theory? So far, I have read Rancière’s
ethics and aesthetics in relation to Plato’s philosophy of love, and I have argued that John Cameron Mitchell
and Stephen Trask create an embodiment of this ideal relationality in their protagonist Hedwig-Tommy.
However, Socrates’ narcissistic in-between subject merely sets up a space for communication and a possibility
for creative reformation. It does not provide any specific suggestions of how this new being may function or
what its potential purpose may be beyond its connective capabilities. Bersani argues that this is an important
(and possibly sufficient) beginning: there is no doubt “that our lives would be better” if the world was never
considered as “outside” of the self (Intimacies 124-125). According to Bersani, “the fundamental premise of
impersonal narcissism is that to love the other’s potential self is a form of self-love, a recognition that the
partners in this intimacy already share a certain type of being” (Intimacies 124). However, both John Cameron
Mitchell and Rancière would suggest that there is an emancipatory promise evoked by the in-between subject
that can be taken significantly further than this.
In accordance with such a promise, Hedwig and the Angry Inch thus moves beyond its previously sustained
Socratic symbolism at the climactic point of the drama. Bersani argues that Socrates’ ideal being merely exists
virtually and must be traced according to its relationship to itself: “[v]irtual being is unmappable as a distinct
identity; it is only in becoming more like itself” (86; original emphasis). According to Bersani, the process of
Socratic love only functions within and in favour of itself, and as such it cannot affect or be affected by its own
movements. Hedwig, its allegorised embodiment, is certainly not “unmappable,” however. The final Tommy-
Hedwig in-between entity bears the marks of all the previous incarnations on its body. His/her face is smeared
with lipstick and eyeshadow and on his/her forehead there is a faded silver cross. Although his/her bare chest is
flat like a man’s, it is damp and stained from the juice of the tomatoes that were used to create Hedwig’s bosom.
In the transformative scene he/she describes him/herself as “A collage / All sewn up” (71) and his/her
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subjective markers are explicitly described in terms of “mapping”: “you can trace the lines / Through Misery’s
design / That map across my body” (Mitchell & Trask 70).
Hedwig-Tommy is not merely a product of dissensual friction, he/she is the friction. He/she carries the bodily
markers of the material or the actual. All his/her experiences and personas are displayed on his/her skin. The
shared body is literarily a map of the play’s various conflicts. Yet this Socratic in-between entity, in all its
symbolic power, is definitely virtual or abstract to some degree. The question is whether virtuality is necessarily
actuality’s mimetic counterpart.  Bersani is assuming that the virtual engages in the same simplistic type of
mimetic relationship with the “real” that Rancière finds between image and form in The Republic. This is not
necessarily the case. As Luciana Parisi establishes in Abstract Sex, the virtual body, although not material is “real”
“in terms of strength or potential that tends towards actualization or emergence” (14). Like Bersani, she
considers the interaction between the actual material and the virtual body, but for Parisi the virtual is the
mapping of materiality: “The mutations of a body are not predetermined by a given ideal or infrastructure
defining the realm of biological possibilities of a body. On the contrary, these mutations designate the abstract
or virtual operations of matter” (14). The virtual can thus never be fully separated from the actual, since the two
necessarily function through each other and continually coalesce in a dance of “symbiotic merging of non-
identical powers ... unfolding the unpredictable mutations of a body” (Parisi 15).
This is a Rancièrean conception of play – specifically the play of the mobilising dissensus. A virtual or abstract
element is necessary in conjunction with an actual emanation to set the redistribution of the sensible into
motion: “Dissensus brings back into play both the obviousness of what can be perceived, thought and done,
and the distribution of those who are capable of perceiving, thinking and altering the coordinates of the shared
world” (Emancipated Spectator 49). Tommy-Hedwig experiences the power of the subjectivity-within-the-
Dissensus, the position in-between the virtual and the actual, the lover and the loved, man and woman in the
final scene of Hedwig and the Angry Inch. As he/she appears as the immanent emanation of the dissenting
principle, it is not merely as a symbol of the divides that have been overcome – he/she is the implosive drive.
Although Tommy-Hedwig has taken centre-stage throughout the performance (forcedly so, when other
characters have tried to make themselves heard), he/she now creates a democratic sphere. The reconciliatory
song, which is sung in unison, describes the Tommy-Hedwig entity as somebody “so much more / Than any
god could ever plan / More than a woman or a man,” who takes “the pieces off the ground / And show[s] this
wicked little town / Something beautiful and new” (Mitchell & Trask 73-74). Finally, the actors break the
prescriptive boundary between stage and audience by moving through the crowd and inviting all willing
members to join the celebration of an unconditional love.
This joyous ending cannot be understood merely through its Socratic analogy. It is the type of dissensual event
that Rancière continually commends throughout his work. In The Emancipated Spectator he particularly
emphasises the possibilities for immanent relationships between actual “reality” and the emanations of the
abstract, the virtual and the performative arts (21-22). This is where a cathartic meta-theatrical “third” in-
between space may be formed and the gifts of sublime or transformative escape lines may be distributed. After
the experience of “A dream / Or a song / That hits you so hard / Filling you up” and is “suddenly gone”
(Mitchell & Trask 75), Hedwig’s audience is invited into an emancipatory space where it for a brief moment is
allowed to “Breathe, Feel, Love / Give – Free!” (75).
Hedwig and the Angry Inch builds up and momentarily sustains a final climactic event, through which its queer
Socratic dialogue of love may give voice to more general transformative possibilities. Hedwig-Tommy and
his/her band disperse among the audience in order to celebrate the gift of freedom with them. This type of
dramatic dialogue does not merely collapse the set boundaries between the characters in the play, but
problematises the very ways to conduct drama and dialogue. The fourth wall is broken down; the audience
becomes part of the play and the characters become part of the immanent whole represented by the crowd.
However, the transpositional effect of the cathartic finale in Hedwig and the Angry Inch is transient. The “third”
space where spectator becomes performer and emancipator will not necessarily be sustained after the theatrical
dynamic loosens its grip, but as Rancière states:
Emancipation begins when we challenge the opposition between viewing and acting; when we
understand that the self-evident facts that structure the relations between saying seeing and doing
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themselves belong to the structure of domination and subjection. It begins when we understand
that viewing is also an action that confirms or transforms this distribution of positions. (Rancière,
Emancipated Spectator 13)
As I am concluding this article, I would like to emphasise that it is merely by going through the distinct forms of
man and woman that Hedwig-Tommy manages to create the frictive dissensus and contrasting dialogue
necessary for his/her final rebirth as an in-between subject. By posing such contrasting theoretical paradigms as
those presented by Bersani, Plato and Rancière, I am attempting to produce a similarly transformative new
space. Rancière acknowledges that past and present ethics and aesthetics take part in a continual dialogue. New
distributions of the sensible are always interacting with their past incarnations: “The aesthetic regime of the arts
is first of all a new regime for relating to the past ... it devotes itself to the invention of new forms of life on the
basis of an idea of what art was, an idea of what art would have been” (Politics of Aesthetics 25; original emphasis).
The past is both a point of departure and a subject for reform. This is certainly true for Rancière’s own use of
Plato in The Politics of Aesthetics, Aesthetics and Its Discontents, The Future of the Image and elsewhere. Plato represents
a stigmatizing division that subsequent art as well as creative social reforms have had to overcome (Politics of
Aesthetics 15-17). Aesthetics form absolutes and each new artistic expression to some extent challenges them. If
read from a Rancièrean perspective, even Plato’s world of ideas, from which the perfect forms of all concepts
communicate and contrast with their imperfect worldly images, is to some extent constructed as a platform for
heterogeneous dissensus.
Karin Sellberg is a post-doctoral research fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the
Humanities, the University of Edinburgh, where she is also currently teaching courses in English
literature and critical theory. Her current research and previous publications consider formations of
gender and embodiment in contemporary queer theory, fiction and art and theories of materiality, affect
and spatial relations in current identity politics.
Endnotes
1. See for example Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 57-58. 
2. This is rapidly changing, however. There is a 2009 special issue of Borderlines entitled “Rancière on the
Shores of Queer Theory,” edited by Michael O’Rourke and Samuel A. Chambers. 
3. The striking similarities between Rancière’s work and the work of queer theorists such as David
Halperin, Judith Butler and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick is not altogether surprising, considering that they all
express an allegiance to the work of Michel Foucault (Rancière, “Politics and Aesthetics” 191; Halperin
61-65). 
4. See Michael O’Rourke and Samuel A. Chambers’s introduction to the “Rancière on the Shores of Queer
Theory” special issue of Borderlines. 
5. See for example Rancière’s critique of Plato in “Good Times or Pleasures at the Barriers”, Dissensus and
Chronicles of Consensual Times.
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